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Abstract 
Between 1970 and 2000 the proportion of global R&D occurring in low income economies rose 
from two percent to more than 20 percent. However, this rising commitment to R&D does not 
easily translate into the emergence of a family of innovations meeting the needs of low income 
consumers “at the bottom of the pyramid”, since much of these technological resources are 
invested in outdated structures of innovation. A number of transnational corporations are 
targeting these markets but it is our contention that much of the previously dominant innovation 
value chains are either ignorant of the needs of consumers at the bottom of the pyramid, or lack 
the technologies and organisational structures to meet these needs effectively. Instead, the firms 
and value chains that are likely to be most successful in these dynamic new markets are those 
that are emerging in China and India and other developing countries, disrupting global corporate 
and locational hierarchies of innovation. 
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 “We often assume that these frontiers of science will benefit only the richer nations of the world, 
…[But] [i]n fact resource-poor settings can actually drive innovation, demanding ingenious 
product designs that are less expensive, and easier to use, and require less infrastructure. It is 
also easier to disrupt the technological status quo in the absence of entrenched commercial 
interests organised around existing products” (Elias, 2006: 540) 
 
“By and large, disruptive technology is initially embraced by the least profitable customers in a 
market” (Christenson, 1990: xvii) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
However pressing the distributional concerns of redressing inequality and overcoming poverty 
are in the short-run, in the long-run meeting the development needs of humankind requires 
economic growth. This much is indisputable, although the composition of this growth — the 
weight given to different social and environmental parameters — is, of course, subject to 
contestation. Growth can arise from one or a combination of two different sources — an increase 
in the amount of investment applied to production (“extensive growth”) and an improvement in 
the quality of this investment (“intensive growth”). Most rapidly-growing economies draw on 
both the extensive and intensive margins. But, increasingly through the last three centuries, and 
inevitably even more so in the coming centuries, as global resources are depleted the focus of 
attention has been, and will be, placed on the intensive margin. And as we now have also 
realised, innovation and technological change lie at the centre of investment quality and therefore 
at the root of growth and development agendas11.  
 
The implied changes in the agenda for underdevelopment were just as significant, as underlying 
all international poverty and inequality were poor economic conditions. In recent years there 
have been major structural changes in processes of S&T investment. However, little of this has 
filtered through to the development community, which continues to run on old tramlines. In this 
paper we briefly review the old model (Section II) and then focus on the new currents of thinking 
and practice about innovation, so-called Mode 2 innovation (Section III). This is followed in 
Section IV by a discussion of a series of emerging and outlier trends in innovation in various 
global settings. These trends offer the possibility for developing economies of disrupting 
dominant power relations in innovation, and also of better meeting the needs of the poor. This 
leads us in Section V to identify the potentially key role played by an innovation surge in the 
Asian Driver economies12, and its potential relevance to meeting developmental needs in other 
low income economies. In the final section we also note, however, some outstanding science 
policy questions and the importance of keeping these questions alive in policy debates. 
 
                                            
11
 The classic article demonstrating this is, arguably, Solow (1957). 
12
 Other emerging industrialised countries may also offer increased opportunities for poorer developing countries. 
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II. RUNNING ON TRAM-LINES: BEST PRACTICE IN DEVELOPMENT-
CENTRED INNOVATION 
 
In the 1970s an important document brought innovation to the centre of the development 
discussion. The Sussex Manifesto, a key document, identified the importance of science and 
technology (hereafter S&T) in raising economy-wide productivity and output.  
 
“The underlying problem arises from the international division of labour in science and 
technology and the present massive orientation of world scientific effort to the problems and 
objectives of interest principally to the advanced countries.” (Sussex Manifesto, p. 1)  
 
Not only was there insufficient investment in Least Developing Country science and technology 
but what existed was marred by an “external brain-drain” of skill migration to high income 
economies as well as an “internal brain-drain” as domestic S&T systems, largely publicly 
financed, were modelled on advanced country institutions. As a result high-level human and 
capital resources were wastefully built-up with little impact on local economic systems. 
 
A number of solutions were proposed to meet these problems: developing countries should raise 
their R&D expenditure to 0.5 percent of GDP; the advanced countries should support R&D in 
low income economies, including by providing aid and orienting at least five percent of their 
own R&D to meeting the needs of developing countries; a technology transfer bank should be 
established to widen the shelf of existing technologies available to producers in low income 
economies. The Sussex Manifesto concentrated on R&D in research and technology 
organisations (RTOs) as the major source of innovation. Most of these, and the accompanying 
R&D, were in the public sector. In the subsequent decades since the Manifesto was written this 
focus on R&D has been reflected in increasing R&D investments by low income economy 
governments and the international community to meet the needs of low income countries. Table 
1 shows the extent of investment in R&D in such economies. The Sussex Manifesto had 
estimated that at the end of the 1960s only approximately two percent of global R&D occurred in 
the developing economies. Two decades later, this ratio had risen to 10 percent, and by 2000, 
more than one-fifth of global R&D was located in the developing world.  
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Table 1. Developing Countries in Global R&D 
 
c1970 1990 2000 
Share of global R&D 
($PPP) (%) 
2.0 10.2 21.0 
R&D as % GDP NA 0.7 0.9 
Coverage Excluding centrally 
planned 
Including centrally planned and 
NIC economies 
Source: 1970 - Sussex Manifesto, 1970; 1990 and 2000 - UIS Bulletin on Science and Technology 
Statistics, Issue No 1, 2004, cited in M. Bell, 2007 
 
These internal commitments to R&D expansion in developing countries were complemented by 
significant progress in the level of resources devoted by the international community to S&T 
directed at low income economy needs. In addition to widespread support for the expansion of 
tertiary education in the developing world, the most notable investments in global RTOs focused 
on the developing world occurred within the framework of the CGIAR family of agricultural 
research centres. Despite problems in the architecture of these institutions, they did have some 
major early successes, most notably in the case of the Green Revolution. However, while the 
original CG centres did well in selected mandated crops, they did so under particular conditions 
and contexts. Since the early 1980s they do not seem to have achieved similar levels of success, 
and they are now under some threat (Hall et al, 2003). 
 
Despite this increase in commitments to R&D, the development of innovation capacity in many 
low income economies has been poor. Many developing countries do not seem to have been able 
to avoid the very problem that the Sussex Manifesto was trying to avoid — the waste of 
resources arising from what it referred to as “the internal brain drain”. Technology development 
continues to rely on inputs from the industrially advanced economies and is often inappropriate 
to the needs of low income consumers and operating environments with poor infrastructure. The 
shortfall of these innovation processes with respect to meeting the health problems concentrated 
in developing economies (Malaria, HIV-positivity, TB) is increasingly widely-recognised, and 
being confronted (with varying degrees of success) within the context of the Global Fund, the 
Gates Foundation and other initiatives (Chataway et al, 2007, Moran, 2005). In agriculture there 
are still too many examples of local agribusiness bypassing local S&T systems and relying on 
foreign sources of technology to provide up-to-date innovation responses (Keskin et al, 2008). 
10 
In light of these problems, and given the persistent levels of poverty that continue to exist, there 
is a need to give urgent policy attention to processes of innovation which are efficient and 
appropriate for low income developing economies. There is still a large body of opinion that 
would simply increase the levels of expenditure on R&D targeted at, and in, countries with low 
per capita incomes13. However, since the Sussex Manifesto was written, much has changed in the 
structure of best-practice innovation in the industrialised countries, suggesting that business-as-
we-know-it/running-along-the-same-tramlines may no longer be appropriate. Yet in many 
respects, perspectives on S&T in many developing country contexts still faithfully reflect the 
worldview of the Manifesto (Bell, 2006 and 2007; Hall 2005; Clark, 2002, 2009). New ways of 
thinking appear to have had little impact. We believe that these changes are so significant that 
they force us to think about developing country innovation in very different ways. But before 
considering these policy implications in Sections III and IV we highlight some of the major 
changes that have taken place, and continue to do so, in the environment in which innovation 
occurs, and consequently in the architecture of innovation practices. 
 
                                            
13
 Good examples of this can be found in Lipton (1988) and Pardey et al (1997). In the latter the authors provide a detailed account 
of the decline in African agricultural research spending but there is virtually no analysis of why this has happened. Consequently the 
final conclusion focusing on the need to increase finance is unconvincing. The Lipton paper goes further in linking declining research 
expenditures to falling economic rates of return but the analysis virtually ignores institutional questions, concentrating instead on 
poor policy frameworks, below optimum size of research stations and product relevance. 
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III. MODE 2 INNOVATION: NEW CURRENTS IN THE INNOVATION 
STREAM 
 
 
(i) New Industrial Paradigm 
A key development in the structure of innovation processes can be traced back to the 
transformation in industrialised country markets during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Until 
then, the focus on economic growth had been on enhancing the supply response following WW2 
and then the Korean War. This was essentially an environment of constrained supply in an era in 
which per capita incomes were not much different to those in current middle-income economies. 
It was a world characterised by relatively limited product diversity, thus allowing for economies 
in scale in production, utilising inflexible dedicated equipment and hierarchical labour processes. 
This production paradigm has variously been referred to as mass production or Fordism and was 
extensively chronicled by Piore and Sabel, Best and others (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990). 
The move from Fordism to post-Fordism entailed moving to just-in-time production systems and 
leaner, interdisciplinary production systems. 
 
The superiority of post-Fordist systems was evident in a number of respects. It provided for 
increased flexibility and diversity, exemplified currently by the Zara clothing retail chain which 
changes its product offering every week. By reducing defects and wastage, and especially by 
thinning inventory lines and producing to order rather than to forecast, it was also significantly 
cost-saving. In computing Dell’s make-to-order offering is now widely replicated across 
industries. Crucially it also led to fundamental changes in the nature of work and the organisation 
of firms and value chains. If a single phrase were to sum up the innovation challenge provided by 
this new production paradigm, it is one of enhanced clock-speed (Stalk and Hout, 1990).  
 
Toyota’s advance to supremacy in the global auto sector reflects its mastery of lean production. 
It achieves high levels of quality, and couples this with rapid product innovation, excellent price-
quality trade-offs, and thin-inventories. It is widely-copied across industries. Critically, the new 
production paradigm is not confined to manufacturing — global agricultural-to-retail value 
chains, coordinated by retail giants such as Walmart and Tesco, illustrate the generic nature of 
12 
the competitiveness of this new system of innovation and production (Womack and Jones, 1996) 
and the new paradigm has even been implemented in hospital design (Kaplinsky, 1995). 
 
A number of features of this production paradigm reflected a sharp divergence from the model 
implicit in the Sussex Manifesto. In the first place, Toyota distinguished between big changes 
(“kaikaku”) and small incremental changes (“kaizen”) (Womack and Jones, 1996). The R&D and 
S&T approach to technology development was very much in the mould of kaikaku. But, in 
reality, Toyota and its followers were able to show that the cumulative effect of a myriad of 
small changes within the production and design process added up to rapid and significant 
changes.14 These changes are referred to as “kaizen”, continuous improvement, and result from 
active participation by the labour force in making suggestions for improvement in process and 
product (Imai, 1987). The numbers of these suggestions from the labour force — requiring, by 
the way, a shift from the single-tasking and single skilling Taylorist division of labour in mass 
production — were staggering. 
 
A second distinguishing feature of innovation in the lean production paradigm is its 
interdisciplinarity and in-parallel nature. This is exemplified by the ability that Toyota and other 
Japanese automakers have developed to reduce the design cycle for a new car from more than 
eight years to less than 18 months. This was achieved by the introduction of cross-functional 
design teams — a mix of disciplines and functions — and having them work in parallel, rather 
than in sequence. This is referred to as “concurrent engineering”. In the previous paradigm, there 
was a strict sequence of specialisation and temporal separation in the design and development 
cycle, with each function working on its task only when the previous function had completed and 
passed on its work. An important component of these concurrent engineering teams is that the 
end-actors in the production chain — marketing and sales — are included in these teams to 
ensure that the products are pulled by customer demand, rather than pushed by the imperatives of 
supply.15  
 
                                            
14
 The importance of incremental technical change had, at the micro level, been demonstrated for some time in the industrially 
advanced countries (Hollander, 1965), as well as in developing economies (Katz, 1987). But the significance of this micro-level of 
change had been little noticed, either in innovation theory or in institutional design. 
15
 Similar principles were reflected in the transition from just-in-case inventory push systems in mass production to just-in-time pull 
systems in lean production (Womack and Jones,  1996; Kaplinsky, 1995) 
13 
The third distinguishing feature of the lean production paradigm led on directly from this. 
Concurrent engineering practices were extended from the different functions within the firm to 
the different links within the value chain. Systemic efficiency, thus, required close interaction 
across the spectrum of firms involved in the chain. Crucially, governance by lead firms was 
required to coordinate this innovation cycle, which increasingly involved high-trust relations 
between firms without the cement of internalisation through dominant equity holdings (Sako, 
1992). 
 
As described, this new paradigm involved close interaction between innovation and production. 
There was no clear separation of the innovation process as an “S&T” activity driven by R&D 
from highly-skilled scientists and technologists. This, of course, is not to say that there was no 
S&T or R&D content, but rather that these were often subsumed in, and integrated with, the 
design and production and marketing functions within and between firms. This point has recently 
been emphasised in Bell’s recent report to UNCTAD (2007) on overseas development 
assistance. Based upon detailed empirical analysis over the last 50 years or so he argues that 
successful technology development is largely enterprise-based and relies on “public sector 
science” only to a limited extent. R&D is important, of course, but it is not where innovation 
mainly takes place and it is innovation, not R&D that really drives possibilities for poverty 
reduction. 
 
Take, for example, industrial activity. It really does not matter whether you are considering a 
cassava processing plant in Ghana or a deep water petroleum facility off the coast of Angola. In 
either case the investment activities associated with any new venture will follow roughly the 
same rules. The firm will determine the macroeconomic and government regulatory contexts, 
specify the process and product design, the ancillary facilities such as power and water supply, 
the necessary financial and due diligence components, and associated contracting and sub-
contracting arrangements for its engineering. Management of the package is a highly skill-
intensive process and one that takes time. It will, of course, hopefully embed the latest 
knowledge as a necessary condition, but in practice every project is a new project and it is in this 
process of “getting it right” that much of the necessary learning and innovation takes place. Bell 
also shows that in general the resources needed here are many multiples of basic and applied 
14 
“research rich countries costs.” It is in the doing of it that knowledge is expanded. And this is 
where the private sector is so successful. No enterprise would tolerate the levels of economic 
inefficiency routinely exhibited by public sector science. It could not afford to.16 
 
(ii) From Mode 1 to Mode 2 
 
A second factor that has begun to influence the innovation debate is the concept of Mode 2 
science introduced by Gibbons and his colleagues in a book published in 199417. Ever since the 
publication of the Rothschild report on UK science policy in 197118, which introduced the notion 
of the “customer-contractor” relationship into government R&D expenditure policy,19 there had 
been an implicit realisation that bureaucratic separation of “science” from “economic 
production” was an inefficient way of managing resources. Indeed this view probably goes back 
even further to the famous Reith lecture of C.P. Snow in the late 1950s20. By the 1990s there had 
arisen a whole series of institutional changes designed to tie public investment in “science” to 
stated welfare objectives. Good examples of this were the creation of the UK Biotechnology 
Directorate in 1980, the UK DTI Link scheme of the 1990s and the establishment of Foresight 
Exercises in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Common to all of these “institutional 
innovations” was the realisation that the search for and validation of knowledge needed to 
involve a much wider body of stakeholder interests and capacities than had been the 
conventional case. Not only had R&D expenditures become merely a part of the story but also 
the funding activities of research councils and other donors were struggling to give this 
operational meaning in practice. 
 
The concept of Mode 2 innovation was developed to characterise and theorise this transition in 
innovation paradigm, and to contrast this against the inherited Mode 1 model implicit in the 
S&T-R&D science-push approach implicit in the Sussex Manifesto (Gibbons et. al., 1994). In 
the words of Nowotny et al (2003) its broad thesis was that: 
 
                                            
16
 See also Bell (2005) 
17
 See Gibbons et al (1994) 
18
 See Rothschild (1971) 
19
 Similar developments began in other high income economies but we have used the UK for illustrative purposes 
20
 See Snow (1963) 
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“The old paradigm of scientific discovery (Mode 1) characterised by the hegemony of 
disciplinary science, with its strong sense of an internal hierarchy between the disciplines and 
driven by the autonomy of scientists and their host institutions, the universities, was being 
superseded — although not replaced — by a new paradigm (Mode 2) which was socially 
distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary and subject to multiple accountabilities”.21 
 
The argument is both positive (this is what is actually taking place) and normative (it represents 
an opportunity to improve best practice) and has caused considerable debate within scientific and 
related communities. The essential characteristics of Mode 2 knowledge may be summarised as 
follows: 
 
It is generated within the context of application and not solely through scientific experiment 
It is essentially trans-disciplinary and not solely reducible to the outputs of single disciplines 
It is developed within and across widely different organisational forms 
It is “reflexive” in the sense that it is not reducible to an objective investigation of “natural law” 
but is rather a dialogue between research actors and subjects 
Quality is controlled not only by scientific peer review but also by other actors including 
research “clients” 
Issues of policy, commercialisation (including intellectual property rights) and accountability are 
now very much to the fore in corresponding science management 
 
What this adds up to is that the framing context in which knowledge generation/validation takes 
place has changed. Even where S&T and R&D intensity is necessitated by the knowledge-
intensive nature of technologies, the capacity of technology suppliers to determine the innovation 
agenda has been curbed. Instead, research efforts are steered by demanding providers of finance, 
by important intermediary bodies like banks and NGOs and by the needs of users. Researchers 
are increasingly accountable to a progressively more complex array of stakeholder groups and 
operate in a context of deepening globalisation. At the same time, and reflecting the reigning-in 
of the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, there has been an increasing tendency for 
knowledge generation to be privately appropriated rather than being seen as a public good. 
                                            
21
 See Nowotny et al (2003), p 15 
16 
In this context, Mode 2 innovation has different characteristics. First, the emphasis on usefulness 
and application has meant that knowledge is developed in the context of use rather than as a 
process detached from production and consumption. Firms, and groups of firms, become a 
primary locus of innovation (Bell, 2007). Secondly, the innovation agenda is increasingly trans-
disciplinary and much of the requisite knowledge is tacit, and held in teams and routines rather 
than stored as abstract and codified information. Third, many more players are incorporated in 
the innovation cycle — for example, workers, NGOs, banks, firms in a value chain and users, as 
well as the “usual suspects”, research and technology organisations (RTOs) and universities. 
And, finally, the innovation process is much more reflexive, involving an interaction (often in a 
number of iterations) between knowledge-producers and knowledge-users. 
 
It is this changing practice in innovation systems, involving systemic efficiency, in parallel-
activities and a combination of big-jumps (“kaikaku”) and small improvements (“kaizen”) which 
has come to dominate the innovation process in some sectors at least in high-income economies. 
Sadly, little of this innovation-best-practice has filtered through to low income economies, who 
predominantly continue to see innovation as a process of big-pushes, driven by R&D and 
investment in S&T or investment in industrial processes without sustained linkages to users. This 
leads to major anomalies in a number of contexts. The development of a powerful 
pharmaceutical industry in India is a landmark in the history of industrial development 
(Chataway, Kale and Wield, 2008) and has done much to provide cheap generic drugs to the 
world. However, partly because of failings in the health system, it has had limited impact on the 
needs of the poor in India. Moreover, there is still the problem of how to invest in science in 
relation to the needs of the poor.  How can investment in cutting edge science be oriented to 
meeting critical needs of poor people? So, clearly, much can be offered to speed up and make 
more relevant innovation systems in low-income economies. Mode 2 principles need to be 
applied but Mode 2 principles are unlikely to entirely resolve the problem. 
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IV.  BEYOND MODE 2: NEW CONSUMERS, DISRUPTION AND NEW 
ENTRANTS 
 
If Mode 2 innovation systems offer significant benefits in low-income economy environments, to 
what extent does this meet the challenge of promoting development in these economies? The 
problem is that this wider diffusion of innovation systems will, at best, only help to arrest the 
growth in the innovation-divide between high- and low-income economies. It does little to 
redress the global balance in innovation hegemony or to effectively meet the needs of very low 
income consumers — perhaps not the “bottom billion” (Collier, 2007) below the $1pd MDG 
target, but those one step up in the income ladder with annual household incomes of less than 
$5000. We have, therefore, to think beyond the Mode 1 - Mode 2 innovation divide, and to move 
into an arena which we term “below the radar innovation”.22 This builds on Mode 2 practices, but 
goes beyond them to encompass new and disruptive forms of innovation, which simultaneously 
meet the needs of a very different group of consumers, and potentially change the pecking-order 
currently governing global corporate and national hierarchies.  
 
In sketching-out this emerging pattern of below-the-radar-innovation (hereafter BRI) we begin 
by drawing on strands of new behaviour which are either relatively new, or whose significance 
has, hitherto, been under-recognised. We refer to this ensemble of developments as being “below 
the radar” since the collective significance of these new currents is only poorly recognised at 
present, not just by policymakers, but also by many of the core innovation systems which 
continue to plough an innovation path confident in their long-term supremacy as innovation 
leaders. We begin with a review of some relatively neglected concepts in the innovation systems 
literature (focusing on architectural systems and global value chains rather than on the national 
and regional innovation systems addressed in much of the innovation systems literature). We 
then consider the emergence of new forms of demand-led innovation, before turning to the 
opportunities opened for profitable production by the rapid growth of low-income consumers in 
the global economy. 
 
 
 
                                            
22
 We are grateful to John Bessant for suggesting this terminology to us. 
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4.1. Innovation Systems  
 
Initially put forward by economists such as Nelson and Freeman in the 1980s to explain the rapid 
economic growth of the so-called “newly industrialising countries” (NICs) over the latter part of 
the 20th century23 the use of innovation systems  has been extended and developed widely over 
the past decades.24 Originally the concept was developed to deal with the inability of 
conventional economic variables (such as capital investment and R&D expenditures) to explain 
differential rates of economic performance and to locate the role of knowledge among a much 
wider range of stakeholder groups than had previously been the case. The concept is now used as 
a kind of shorthand for the network of inter-organisational linkages that apparently successful 
countries have built up as a support system for economic production across the board. In this 
sense it has been explicitly recognised that economic creativity is actually about the quality of 
“technology linkages” and “knowledge flows” among and between a wide spectrum of economic 
agents — at least, it has in relation to technology development in the high income economies. 
We shall return to a rather different scenario for low income economies below. There are, 
however, two additional dimensions of innovation systems which are particularly relevant to 
BRI. The first of these is the distinction between component and architectural innovation, first 
highlighted in the early 1990s by Henderson and Clark. The components refer to the core 
modules of knowledge and capability. The architecture refers to the systemic way in which these 
components are combined. 
 
Henderson and Clark make the important point that core capabilities in particular components of 
capability involve routines — structures of governance, of information flow and of organisation 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). They engender forms of path-dependency (Dosi, 1982; Nelson, 
1993) which may blind firms that possess valuable and complex competences in components 
from radically different ways of integrating these components — “[a]rchitectural innovation 
presents established firms with a more subtle challenge. Recognising what is useful and what is 
not, and acquiring and applying new knowledge when necessary, may be quite difficult for an 
established firm because of the way knowledge — particularly architectural knowledge — is 
organised and managed” (Henderson and Clark, 1990: 404). This path dependency is not limited 
                                            
23
 See Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993) for example. NICs refer to the “newly industrialising countries”. 
24
 See, for example, Oyeyinka (2005) 
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to the routines developed by individual links with competences in key core components. It 
applies equally to the design of the architectural system. The system itself, involving often long-
lived relations of trust between key players in the chain, is also characterised by sticky and 
repeated forms of intra-system interaction, and their associated routines. 
 
A second important strand in systems-thinking which is relevant to BRI is that provided by 
global value chain analysis (Gereffi et al, 2005; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001; 
http://www.globalvaluechains.org/). “The value chain describes the full range of activities which 
are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of 
production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various 
producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2001: 4). There are a number of distinctive features to this value chain approach. One is 
that the chain typically has deep routes into its supply base, and extended foliage in its links with 
varied tiers of intermediary processors and final consumers. Chain coordination is thus a key 
component of successful chain performance. Second, and related, the value chain framework is 
not just a heuristic taxonomy for recording flows of products, people and knowledge. The 
coordination which chains require involves power — the power of inclusion/exclusion, the 
setting and monitoring of chain performance standards, and the allocation of the division of 
labour in chain roles. Third, in the context of deepening globalisation, value chains are 
increasingly global, drawing not just on global suppliers, but targeting a global pool of global 
consumers. 
 
How might these strands of systems thinking influence the significance of a new genre of BRI? 
The point is that global value chains involve a consortium of firms and related organisations that 
are brought together in particular business configurations, targeting global markets in the search 
for economies of scale. The individual links in these chains represent the core competences of 
Henderson and Clark; the chain represents their architecture. Given that value chains are trust-
intensive, these increasingly global system architectures are subject to path dependency, drawing 
on and incorporating a range of changing competences and players. The governance of these 
chains is largely in the hands of a relatively small number of TNCs who target global markets 
with global brands (Toyota, L’Oreal, Nike) and established delivery systems (McDonalds). They 
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invest vast sums in the sophisticated learning of the needs of their customer base and in aligning 
the business strategy of their chain organisation to meeting these needs. Although they 
differentiate their final offerings to meet the needs of culturally-specific markets, as a general 
rule these differentiations are minor variations on a theme. For example, even within France, 
Nestlé markets different blends between northern and southern regions. What they know much 
less about are the needs of different consumers, very different operating environments, and of the 
chain configurations that are best suited to meeting these new needs and operating conditions. 
The neglected needs that are most evident are those of very low income consumers in developing 
countries characterised by insecurity, volatility, and poor infrastructure.  
 
4.2. Demand-led Innovation  
 
Mode 1 innovation systems and their associated production structures are essentially supply-
pushed systems. Producers make guesses (sometimes more informed than others) on what they 
think their final users will value. Mode 2 innovation systems, as we have seen, are more 
reflexive, drawing consumers into processes determining the prioritisation of research agendas. 
In some cases, by exercising financial muscle and using contract supply procedures, users pull 
required innovation from production systems; in other cases, producers proactively interact with 
users and other linked bodies in the development of suitable products and processes. 
 
This producer-user interaction is an essential characteristic of the relationship between the 
suppliers of capital and intermediate goods and their downstream user industries, and has been 
long-recognised (including in Pavitt’s taxonomy of innovation, Pavitt, 1984). But, more recently, 
or perhaps more recently recognised, is the role which final consumers play in innovation 
processes. Effective final use often requires considerable learning, and as von Hippel has pointed 
out, the knowledge so produced is asymmetrical; that is, the user knows much more about the 
product and its characteristics than does the producer. Moreover, much of this knowledge is 
path-dependent and context-specific — “In the specific case of product development, this means 
that users as a class will tend to develop innovations that draw heavily on their own information 
about need and context of use” (von Hippel, 2005: 70). 
 
21 
4.3. Bottom of the Pyramid 
 
In their book The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Prahalad and Hammond drew attention 
to the market potential of this new class of consumers (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002), pointing 
out that there was something in the region of 4 billion people living at per capita incomes below 
£2,000 p.a.. Together with Hammond, and in his subsequent book (Prahalad, 2005) Prahalad 
makes three key points which lead him to characterise this market as being “the fortune at the 
bottom of the pyramid”. First, although incomes are low, many of these people are active 
consumers of purchased goods and services. But their consumption is often much more 
socialised than that of higher income consumers. For example, cellular phone handsets in rural 
areas are shared among many users, rather than being individually owned. Second, many of the 
products which the poor consume make intensive use of radical new technologies, a departure 
from products classically highlighted in the appropriate technology literature. And third, and 
perhaps most radically, these poor consumers represent a market of growing significance and 
provide the potential for highly profitable production. Crucially, Prahalad sees this as providing a 
market opportunity for TNCs rather than for the SMEs and locally-owned firms long identified 
in the appropriate technology and informal sector literature as being key providers for low 
income consumers. 
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V.  BELOW THE RADAR INNOVATION: PROSPECTS FOR THE 
FUTURE? 
 
The original Sussex Manifesto was written in 1970 as an advisory document for UN policy 
during the “Second Development Decade”. In many ways it was ahead of its time and sought to 
raise issues that were not part of conventional policy discourse. Regrettably the Manifesto did 
not really make the impact it deserved and time has gone on. Now 40 years ahead it is clear that 
the international context has changed considerably, raising important questions about the role of 
S&T in the new globalised 21st century. We have argued that until the late 20th century, the 
dominant mode of thinking about innovation was to characterise this as a challenge involving the 
application of science and technology (measured through R&D expenditures) to economic 
production. Organisationally this gave primacy to scientific and technological inquiry in 
institutions of higher learning, in RTOs and in the research laboratories of large firms. 
Conceptually this involved a linear conveyor-belt, loosely characterised as science  invention 
 technology  production, beginning in the national system of innovation with very high 
level and disciplinary-specialised skills, and subsequently spreading to the productive sector 
where innovations were implemented by much lower level skills. In the innovations systems 
literature this was referred to as Mode 1 innovation. 
 
This Mode 1 innovation system began to run out of steam for a variety of reasons outlined in 
Section III. It has begun to be supplanted — at least in many high-income economies — by 
Mode 2 forms of organisation, involving greater enterprise-based technology development, a 
heavy input of low-level incremental change, greater interaction among the invention-
development-production components of the innovation-cycle, the undermining of specialised 
disciplinary silos, and a transition from a supply-pushed innovative system to a user-pulled 
funding process. “Best-practice” thinking about innovation and development is thus increasingly 
geared towards the promotion of the Mode 2 framework. There is clearly considerable scope for 
gains to be realised through the promotion of increased enterprise- and farm-based innovative 
efforts, and the reflexive interaction among producing units, NGOs, RTOs and higher 
educational institutions. This policy agenda is increasingly widely recognised (albeit not widely 
implemented) — it is, to open the radar-metaphor, on the strategic radar screens of many private 
sector decisions-makers and policymakers in low income economies. 
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However, at best, the rapid adoption of Mode 2 only offers the possibility of allowing innovation 
systems in low-income countries to arrest the growing innovation gap with high-income 
economies. It does little to challenge the hegemony of established hierarchies in global 
innovation processes. It does not address the challenge of meeting the needs of very low income 
consumers. In some cases this means ignoring the demands of consumers who are happy with 
much lower levels of quality than the products produced for global markets (albeit with 
variation) by TNCs, and who often consume (collectively on occasions) in distinctively different 
patterns from the prevailing markets in the high-income countries and the high-income 
communities within low-income economies. Nor does the Mode 2 model respond centrally to the 
need to develop and diffuse forms of production and service delivery which are appropriate to 
low income economies with poor and unreliable infrastructure and fragmented and seasonal 
markets. And nor does it meet the needs in many sectors (such as health, agriculture and 
education) of developing different distributional systems for the delivery of the products and 
services which they require.  
 
Finally, in key areas such as areas of life sciences, Mode 2 approaches may not resolve science 
policy challenges of redirecting investment in basic science to meet the challenges of the poor. 
For example, it is clear that after more than 10 years of investment in highly creative Mode 2 
experiments in HIV vaccine research in organisations such as the International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative, new approaches to basic science need to be explored. While product and clinical trials-
based approaches were positive in many respects they did not resolve the quandary of how to 
steer basic science, such as in cutting-edge systems biology, in such a way as to be relevant to 
needs to the poor. The current debate over how to evaluate the work of the CGIAR centres and 
scientists is another indication of the same problem. Should CGIAR scientists and centres be 
evaluated through the quantitative metrics relating to citations and publication in world leading 
discipline journals or by their contribution to alleviating poverty and linking to MDGs25? 
 
Given this we anticipate the development and diffusion of a new pattern of innovation in and for 
low income economies, which we characterise as BRI. A BRI approach might take the following 
forms:  
                                            
25
 See also Millennium Project (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of mechanisms designed to link S, T and I to the MDGs 
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(i) In terms of capabilities, it is premised on the reality of growing science and technological 
capabilities in low income economies in general, and in China and India (the two core Asian 
Driver economies) in particular. This follows many decades of investment in education and skill 
development, the growth of large and dynamic capital goods sectors, and growing expertise in 
innovation in business systems, though in poorer regions such as Africa and many parts of Latin 
America such capabilities largely remain to be built.  
(ii) In terms of markets, rapid growth provides enormous incentives for innovation and for the 
reaping of economies of scale and scope (Verdoorn’s Law, McCombie, 1986). However, 
distinctively this is a market of very low-income consumers, with associated trade-offs between 
price and product quality and variety. Since many of these consumers are also closely linked to 
the agricultural sector, incomes often vary seasonally. Large households and dense living also 
provide scope for less individualised and more shared and collective forms of consumption 
(iii) In terms of production parameters, low labour costs provide the potential for less 
mechanised forms of production. Infrastructure is typically poor and unreliable, labour relations 
are distinctive, and in many cases skills amongst the labour force are also low. 
 
Many of these market and production characteristics are long-lived and underpin the long-term 
commitment towards appropriate technology. The new elements are the dynamic market 
conditions and the very substantial accretion of production, skill and technological capabilities in 
low-income economies. As we observed above, a key feature of BRI is the collective 
significance of these various developments underlying innovation as a process. The likelihood, 
therefore, is for the development of new products in China and India aimed at these low-income 
markets. The product-process linkage inherent in many sectors — again, observed in the 
appropriate technology literature — leads to a clustering of production technologies which are 
similarly reflective of operating conditions in these low-income markets. This is not a 
development which is confined to goods (for example, one child per laptop and wind-up 
computers), but also to services (for example, the provision of low cost rural health delivery 
incorporating a mix of western and traditional healers, and innovation in long-distance learning). 
Similarly, this interactive nexus of low-income products and production technologies is not 
confined to the core component technologies identified by Henderson and Clark, but equally to 
the value chains within which they are embedded.  
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Thus, we anticipate a new generation in innovation systems, with the core development of low-
income economy specific products and processes being located in low-income economies, 
particularly China and India. Because of the context of their development, they are particularly 
appropriate for other low-income economies. We can already observe this in Africa, for example. 
Many of the professional elites examining the entry of China into the continent are dismissive of 
the very poor quality of many Chinese products. However, from the perspective of very poor 
consumers, a wireless costing $2 may look and sound tinny, and may have a relatively limited 
lifespan. But it is cheap, and it is appropriate. Similarly on health, some generically produced 
drugs (such as those treating TB and malaria) may not have the same level of therapeutic benefit 
as the newest variants of treatment, but they are low-cost and will often minimise the worse 
aspects of a morbidity-inducing condition such as chronic high blood pressure.   
 
But to what extent is this disruptive of established innovation hierarchies? Here it is helpful to 
turn to the ideas of Christenson, whose writings on disruptive innovation have been so influential 
(Christenson; 1997). Christenson addresses the failure of well-performing companies to exploit 
the development of new technologies. His argument is essentially that this weakness flows 
directly from their core strengths, which is that they invested considerable resources in acutely 
understanding the needs of their core customers. Thus when a new technology arrives, which 
fails to address these known needs effectively, the major innovating firms are dismissive. For 
example, IBM neglected the arrival of the 51/4” floppy disc since it was hopelessly inadequate for 
the needs of its corporate customers who required vast quantities of data-storage. Its problem 
was that it knew its existing customer base too well, but had no feel for a new generation of 
much less demanding customers. As Christenson observed, the previously dominant industry 
leaders “…..were as well-run as one could expect a firm managed by mortals to be — but that 
there is something about the way decisions get made in successful organisations what sows the 
seeds of eventual failure”. They failed precisely because they listened to their customers so well 
— “the logical, competent decisions of management that are critical to the success of their 
companies are also why they lose their positions of leadership“(Christenson, 1997: xiii). 
Christenson goes on to observe that “[b]y and large, disruptive technology is initially embraced 
by the least profitable customers in a market” (op. cit: xvii) 
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We are anticipating a similar process with regard to the new families of low-income goods and 
services associated with Asian-Driver based innovation. The disruption in this case is not the 
arrival of new technologies that drive the search for new markets, but the disruption provided by 
distinctively new types of consumers, based in low income countries. These markets induce 
innovation. But in the same way that IBM was oblivious to the significance of what subsequently 
came to represent an enormous market of distributed computing and memory-storage, so too the 
existing innovation leaders are unable to either recognise, or to exploit these dynamic new 
market opportunities. Their trajectories and market antennae inhibit them from fully recognising 
these new opportunities which are “below the radar”. Their cost structures — not just with regard 
to their core component technologies, but also the structure of their value chains — make it 
difficult to address these markets, even if they are recognised. And their trajectories and routines 
place severe obstacles in their dynamic response to these new opportunities.  
 
In this critical disruptive sense, BRI flies in the face of Prahalad’s assertions that northern MNCs 
can effectively grasp the market opportunities which he correctly identified as arising from the 
growth of low income consumers in the Asian Driver economies. He argued that “[b]y 
stimulating commerce and development at the bottom of the economic pyramid, [northern-based] 
MNCs could radically improve the lives of billions of people… Achieving this goal does not 
require multinationals to spearhead global social development initiatives for charitable purposes. 
They need only act in their own self interest, for there are enormous business benefits to be 
gained by entering developing markets” (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002: 4). 
 
Of course there are parallels with the idea of BRI and the appropriate technology movement. In a 
sense BRI is the maturation of many of the ideas of the AT movement, including the idea of 
blending simple technologies with advanced technologies such as electronics and 
nanotechnology (Bhalla, 1984). What is different is that BRI involves the movement of 
appropriate innovation from the fringes of the growth process and from the purview of the NGO 
movement to the centre of the globally-dynamic segments of the global economy, the core of 
profit generation and appropriation in the corporate sector and the heart of social provision by 
the state in low income markets. Crucially, it is a process predominantly driven in low income 
27 
economies, by low income economy firms and in some areas by the inclusion of (social and 
natural) scientists and technologists based in low income countries.  
 
To the extent that such a change in emphasis takes place it will be crucially necessary to 
incorporate appropriate institutional change within the publicly-financed knowledge system 
itself, for research institutes and higher education bodies in many low income economies are still 
largely operating as Mode 1 organisations. As such their impact on development is much less 
than it could be. For example, new entrepreneurs are often forced to rely on foreign technical 
inputs even in areas like simple food processing where local expertise should be available 
(Keskin et al; 2009). Similarly universities produce graduates for whom there are not only no 
jobs but also whose training is well below international standards. Further, in some disciplines — 
not least the economics faculties of many African universities — the intellectual agenda is highly 
specialised and is driven by the desire to mimic course content in northern universities, in part to 
facilitate the international mobility of academic practitioners. Consequently, the best graduates 
often then join the external brain drain and are effectively lost to the local economy.26 
Possibilities for capacity building are also diminished considerably. Hence while there has been a 
gradual movement towards Mode 2 patterns of institutional behaviour in the high income 
economies, this has not really taken place in many of the poorest low income economies, 
especially in relation to their universities and agricultural development. Similar criticisms have 
been levelled at the use (and abuse) of international aid funding which appears to prop up 
research organisations (located in both rich and poor countries) and linked NGOs but with little 
obvious impact on ultimate users. And, as mentioned above, even CGIAR institutes established 
with a specific developmental mandate are now under serious criticism for their apparent lack of 
impact.   
 
                                            
26
 In a recent Panorama TV programme looking at what happens to UK tax payers money as overseas aid one component asked 
soon-to-be graduates in Uganda where they wanted to work. The vast majority stated they wished to work for an international donor. 
We are grateful to Ian Maudlin and Andy Frost for drawing our attention to this point. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have tried to show that modern analyses of innovation policy for low income 
economies are still unduly focused on traditional (and in our view outdated) assumptions about 
the interactivity of science and economic production. At the same time there has been little 
appreciation of the potential for change shown by economic systems in East and South Asia. The 
policy agenda must now shift towards understanding in much more detail the underlying 
dynamics of technology developments currently taking place in countries we have labelled the 
Asian Drivers, where new patterns of institutional change and capacity building are evolving 
under the radar, so to speak. We also need to understand how this context of innovation may or 
may not make the resulting products and services, and the value chains in which they are 
delivered, appropriate to other low income economies. Some of the results of this understanding 
will undoubtedly make for uncomfortable reading since they will call into question many of our 
deeply-held assumptions about the structure and functioning of established knowledge systems. 
Nevertheless the challenges are exciting since they hold out possibilities for a genuine 
breakthrough in international development. In this way perhaps poverty might indeed “become 
history.”  
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